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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH RASMUSSEN AND FAUN \ 
RASMUSSEN, J 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, F 
. • ) No. 4218 
— vs. — | 
NEAL G. DAVIS AND DORA S. DAVIS, \ 
Defendants and Respondents. f 
/ 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
DISCUSSION OF THE CASE 
To understand this case one must bear in mind what 
the contract is about, the terms of the contract and how the 
case developed on the pleadings. A general knowledge, 
based upon observation, of the operation of a Grade A 
Dairy Enterprise is also most helpful. 
The Davises owned and operated a farm upon which 
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they carried on a Grade A Dairy. This farm was fully 
equipped with a modern home, barns, milk sheds, farm 
machinery and livestock, registered Holstein milch cows, 
a flock of chickens, and a small herd of sheep. All these 
properties were used together as a going concern. On the 
15th day of March, 1951, after Kenneth Rasmussen, the 
plaintiff and appellant, had gone over the place with Mr. 
Davis, the defendant, and had made his own observations 
of the land, and all the implements, equipment, and after 
Mrs. Rasmussen had inspected the house twice, the parties 
entered in the contract whereby the Davises agreed to sell 
and the Rasmussens agreed to buy all this property, for the 
agreed price of $32,000.00. Rasmussen and Davis together 
consulted an attorney and had him write their contract. 
The contract stipulated that the purchase price was to be 
paid as follows: 
$8,000.00 down, which was paid, and is now the issue 
of this law suit. 
$5,000.00 on or before January 1st, 1952, and the balance 
in annual installments of $3,000.00 each until the last pay-
ment, that being $4,000.00, with interest on the deferred 
balance at 4% per annum. 
The second installment of $5,000.00, which was to be 
paid January 1st, 1952, was represented by a promissory 
Note executed by the buyers and was secured by a chattel 
mortgage on some cattle then owned by the Rasmussens 
(not the cattle sold under the contract). 
The contract also provided that since the buyers were 
let into possession, they should pay the taxes on the property, 
etc. 
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Kenneth Rasmussen seemed to have the idea that he 
could leave the operation of this farm and the Grade A 
Dairy project to the mercies of his wife and daughters, 
while he held down a wage-earning job elsewhere, for he 
spent his working time at Lark, Utah, and the women carried 
on at the Dairy. 
As anyone, except an extreme optimist, would expect, 
Mr. Rasmussen was disappointed with the crops and with 
the income from the farm and dairy. He made some com-
plaints to Mr. Davis throughout the summer and fall, but 
these related primarily to the terms for payment of the 
balance of the purchase price, and some efforts were made 
by him, in which Mr. Davis cooperated with him, looking 
toward the Rasmussens refinancing the debt. It being under-
stood that they intended Mr. Rasmussen was to borrow mon-
ey elsewhere and pay up the obligation to Davis. All such 
efforts, however, were unsuccessful. 
Then, on December 31, 1952, the last day before the 
$5,000.00 installment which was represented by the note and 
chattel mortgage became due, the plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint in this action. 
Now, please notice his complaint. 
First: He alleges that the provisions of the contract 
relating to the rights reserved by Davis and his right to 
retake possession of the property in case of default by the 
buyer are void, being against publis policy. 
Second: He alleges that Davis made certain false 
representations regarding the character of the land to the 
damage of plaintiffs in the sum of $25,000.00. 
3 
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So, he prays the Court: 
1. To strike from the contract the provisions relating 
to liquidated damages and the right to possession. 
2. And, standing on the contract as they wanted it, 
amended by the Court, they demand judgment against de-
fendant for $25,000.00 damages for fraud; and 
3. They want the Court to off-set their damages against 
what they still owe for the property, including the $5,000.00 
of the principal, and ten months interest on $24,000.00, due 
January 1, 1952. 
Note the result if they had been permitted to get away 
with that: 
They get a judgment for $25,000.00 damages for the 
fraud, which wipes out all they still owe on the property 
and they get title to property which is estimated by all con-
cerned to be worth at least $30,000.00 for $8,000.00, their 
initial down payment. 
To the plaintiffs complaint the defendants answered, 
prayed the plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint and 
set up the following counterclaims: 
First counterclaim the defendants asked for a judgment 
and decree declaring that the contract be rescinded, that 
defendants have right to immediate possession, and that de-
fendants have the right to retain as liquidated damages all 
payments which had been made by plaintiffs on the purchase 
price, for attorneys fees, for costs, or in the alternative, that 
the Court adjudge and decree that the contract be terminated 
on account of the breach, that defendants be restored the 
immediate possession of the property, that the defendants 
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have judment against the plaintiff for damages in the sum 
of $10,000.00, and in case the court refused to restore pos-
session of property to defendants, for the court to appoint a 
receiver to take possession, for attorneys fees and for costs. 
Second Counterclaim, that if the court shall refuse to 
award the relief prayed for on the first counterclaim, then 
that the defendants have judgment against the plaintiffs for 
the sum of $5,000.00 for installments of principal, $1,000.00 
interest, taxes, insurance, and attorneys fees; and that the 
chattel mortgage be foreclosed and the personal property 
therein be sold as provided by law. 
Third Counterclaim for the sum of $1,805.00, together 
with interest for items of personal property which was left 
on the premises on plaintiffs promise to buy. 
The plaintiffs answered the defendants counterclaim, 
they allege the forfeiture provision is null and void, admit 
they have not paid the $5,000.00 due, but allege they are 
entitled to off-set it against damages for the fraud perpetrated. 
They deny they have refused to pay taxes or insurance. They 
deny they committed waste on the premises and admit they 
sold some equipment. They accept defendants offer to re-
scind, and consent that defendants retain sufficient of the 
$8,000.00 to pay for property not returned and the reason-
able rental value. They deny other allegations in first coun-
terclaim. 
They answered the second counterclaim by admitting 
they have not paid the $5,000.00, that they are entitled to 
off-set it against the damages for fraud. 
In the plaintiffs answer to the third counterclaim they 
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admit some liability and deny the remainder. That they 
also desire to off-set this against the fraud damages in their 
original complaint. 
Shortly after defendants answer was signed and filed, 
the parties got together and compromised their differences; 
the buyers gave up possession to the sellers, made restitu-
tion for certain items of personal property, which they 
could not return, and the sellers agreed to give up the 
$5,000.00 note and chattel mortgage. 
Then on June 26th, 1952, or 131 days after the buyers 
had surrendered the property to the sellers, the plaintiffs 
filed an amended supplemental complaint, in which they, in 
effect, abandoned their case as set out in the original com-
plaint, and sued upon the theory that the contract had been 
rescinded by agreement of the parties, except as to the dis-
position of the $8,000.00 which they alleged the parties had 
agreed should be divided by the attorneys or by the Court. 
They only asked for $6,000.00 judgment in this amended 
complaint. 
In their answer the defendants agree the parties got 
together and settled and compromised their case, but deny 
that the settlement of the $8,000.00 was left to the attorneys 
or the Court to divide. The defendants allege that the 
$8,000.00 remained with the sellers in the parties compromise 
agreement. 
The plaintiffs in their reply denied that the agreement 
was that the defendants were to keep the $8,000.00. 
The case was then tried on these issues, as shown by 
the amended complaint, answer and reply. 
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APPELLANTS POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVI-
DENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS, FAUN RASMUS-
SEN, ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE 
EFFECT THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAIN-
TIFF, TOLD HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE 
PREMISES THAT THE ATTORNEYS WERE TO DETER-
MINE WHO SHOULD GET THE $8000.00 AND IF THEY 
COULD NOT AGREE IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY 
THE COURT. (Tr. 185) 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO 
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN 
THIS CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE 
IS A VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72) 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY QUES-
TION INVOLVED IN WHETHER THE DOWN PAYMENT 
OF $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY B E CONSIDERED AS 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT 
TO THE JURY TO DECIDE. (R. 73) 
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POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE 
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT 
IS FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT 
PLAINTIFFS TERMINATED S A I D CONTRACT OF 
THEIR OWN FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00 
DOWN PAYMENT PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT 
SHOULD BE AND HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAIN 
TIFFS TO DEFENDANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, 
WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMI-
NATES ANY QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO BE DETER-
MINED BY THE JURY. (R. 73) 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS FAILED TO PAY THEIR PART OF THE TAXES 
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT 
AND FAILED TO PAY THE FIRE INSURANCE PRE-
MIUM UPON THE PROPERTY. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES 
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR 
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND THE DEFENDANTS 
SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS. 
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POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DE-
FENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST 
THE PLAINTIFFS. 
A R G U M E N T 
APPELLANTS POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVI-
DENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS, FAUN RASMUS-
SEN, ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE 
EFFECT THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAIN-
TIFF, TOLD HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE 
PREMISES THAT THE ATTORNEYS WERE TO DETER-
MINE WHO SHOULD GET THE $8000.00 AND IF THEY 
COULD NOT AGREE IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY 
THE COURT. (Tr. 185) 
There was no error in sustaining the objection to the 
proffered testimony. 
If the evidence was offered to prove what agreement 
had been made by the parties for the compromise of the 
lawsuit, it was clearly incompetent because it was hearsay 
and self serving. 
But we now learn from appellants brief that it was 
not offered for any such purpose. Counsel say it was offered 
to rebut a claim which mght be made to the effect that 
Mrs. Rasmussen was bound by what her husband and Davis 
had agreed to do about the $8,000.00 unless she made 
timely objection. 
9 
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But even for such limited purpose, the proffered evi-
dence was immaterial and incompetent. The evidence, if it 
had been admitted, could not have changed the result. It 
would not have proved nor tended to prove that she was 
not bound by the agreement. The fact that the statement 
was made by the husband to his wife was not relevant to 
any fact in issue, and hence the authority cited in the 
brief is not applicable. 
Furthermore, even if there were error in the Court's 
ruling, the same was a harmless error and should not result 
in a reversal of the judgment. 
APPELLANTS POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO 
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN 
THIS CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE 
IS A VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72) 
We offer no argument on appellants Point Two because 
they make none. 
APPELLANTS POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY QUES-
TION INVOLVED IN WHETHER THE DOWN PAYMENT 
OF $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY B E CONSIDERED AS 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME 
10 
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SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT 
TO THE JURY TO DECIDE. (R. 73) 
There is no evidence in the case proving or tendng to 
prove that the disposition of the $8,000.00 was to be left to 
the attorneys or to the court. The evidence on this subject 
shows that the whole case was settled by the agreement 
of the parties. 
Be it remembered that appellants in their amended and 
supplemental complaint (R. 27, paragraphs 11 and 12) allege 
that Kenneth Rasmussen and Neal G. Davis met and entered 
into an oral agreement and that the contract was rescinded 
between plaintiffs and defendants except as to the $8,000.00 
which the plaintiffs paid to the defendants act the time that 
contract was entered into, and that as to the $8,000.00, 
Kenneth Rasmussen and Neal Davis agreed that Davis should 
retain sufficient of the $8,000.00 to reimburse him for the 
rental of the property during the time defendants were 
in possession and any damage that might have been 
done t o the premises a n d personal property during 
such possession, and that Kenneth Rasmussen would get 
in contact with his attorneys in an attempt to get an agree-
ment with the defendants as to the amount of the $8,000.00 
that should be retained by Davis as rental and damages. 
In their answer ot the Amended and Supplemental Com-
plaint (R. 39) the defendants admit that the contract was 
rescinded by agreement of the parties, they deny the alleg-
ations concerning the $8,000.00, and in connection therewith 
defendants allege that the agreement was that Davis should 
keep the $8,000.00 and be returned to possession and have 
11 
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the hay and sheep which Rasmussen returned and that 
Davis agreed to give up the $5,000.00 note and mortgage 
on Rasmussens' cattle, along with interest, taxes, insurance 
and attorneys fees. 
And in their Reply (R 43, paragraph 2) plaintiffs admit 
that the contract between them and the defendants was 
rescinded but they deny that the $8,000.00 should be kept 
by the defendants. 
The record being so on the pleadings, the sole issue 
was whether or not the agreement for compromise em-
bodied the stipulation alleged by the plaintiffs concerning 
the $8,000.00. 
On this issue the burden was on the plaintiffs to 
prove their allegations. They failed to carry their burden. 
There is no evidence in the record to show that the agree-
ment was as alleged by the plaintiffs or anything like it. 
There was a complete failure of evidence to support their 
claims. Indeed, according to the testimony of both Ras-
mussens, the evidence points almost conclusively the other way 
and sustains defendants' allegations. 
Kenneth Rasmussen testified (Tr. 18); A conversation 
on the property in July, 1951: 
"I told him (Davis) that I would like to have him 
take the place back and give me the cows — give me 
my cows back, the mortgage on it." 
Davis said: (R 19) "I am going to wait until the 
first of the year and then I will either have the $5,000.00 
payment or I will take the cows." 
Again (Tr. 25) They talked on February 13, 1952, at 
the Davis home in Ephram: 
12 
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"I said, (Rasmussen) I want that $8,000.00 back. 
He (Davis) said you are not going to get $8,000.00 
back, and he said, I f you don't — if you stop the sale 
of this — if you stop this sale, I will sue you for a lot 
more than this $8,000.00'." 
Again on February 14, 1952, which is the day they 
moved off the farm, (Tr. 42) in answer to questions by the 
Court. 
"The Court: 
Q: You insist now that you did not make any agreement 
with respect to the $8,000.00? 
A: That is right. 
Q: Did you say anything about it? 
A: He said, 'I won't give you a penny of it.' 
Q: What did you say? 
A: I said, *I want part of it back.' 
Q: Is that about all of that conversation . . . about all 
there was to that conversation? 
A: That was about all, yes." 
Then they moved off. 
Again, on cross examination, referring to the conver-
sation . . . June or latter part of July, he testified: (R 99) 
"I said, 'I am sick of it . . . I am so sick of it, that 
I would damn near give it back to you, if you would 
give me the mortgage on my cows'." 
Again (Tr. 109), referring to the talk . . . the Davis 
home, in February, 1952, he testified the $8,000.00 was not 
mentioned. Again, (Tr. 113): 
"I said how about giving me back the $8,000.00 
13 
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He said, 'I won's give it back to you.' He said, 'if you 
don't get off there, it is going . . . if you stop this sale 
on this property that I have, it will cost you a lot more'." 
Again (Tr. 117, line 21 to 30 and Tr. 118, lines 1 
to 22): 
A: "Neal and I made this deal, my wife was not there. 
Then it came down to the releasing of the mortgage. 
He said that he would release this mortgage on the 
cows and give me that back and then we talked 
a little while and then he asked about the $8,000.00. 
He said, 'I want that $8,000.00 and all this cancelled 
off/ I said, 'No, sir, I want that $8,000.00, you mis-
represented this to me, and the whole deal all the 
way through has been misrepresented and I want the 
$8,000,007' 
Q: This is out in front on the 13th of February? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Go on, what else was said? 
A: He wanted me to come to his Attorney and fix the 
matter. I said, 'I could not do a thing until I had 
talked to my Attorney'. 
Q: How do you know you could not do a thing about it? 
A: If you put it into law, they have a right to it. Isn't 
that right? 
Q: Don't ask me. 
A: Well, that is the way I understood the matter. 
Q: All right, what else did Neal say? 
A: That is about the size of it, that he wanted the $8,000.00 
14 
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Q: And tell us again who was present? 
A; Neal and I. 
Q: Did he refuse to give you the $8,000.00? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And you turned over possession and everything, at 
that time? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did he promise to give you back any part of that 
$8,000.00? 
A: No, sir." 
Again (Tr. 131) referring to his testmony by deposition, 
we fired these questions and answers: 
Q: (by Mr. Tibbs) The third sentence on page 14, from 
the top. 
"Did you understand that this settlement that you and 
Mr. Davis entered into in this case? A. No, sir. Q. Now, 
just a minute, did you understand that is was settled? A. 
No, sir, not until I talked to my attorney, I could not 
settle it. Q. You don't know what happened or what 
you agreed to then? A. I could not do anything until 
I had talked with my attorney. Q. So far as you were 
concerned, it had ended the case? 
MR. HANSEN. I think we will object. It calls for a 
conclusion of the witness and it is not a proper ques-
tion. So far as you were concerned, just answer the 
question? A. Yes, sir." 
MR. HANSEN. We insist upon our objetion, at this time, 
as calling for a conclusion of the witness. 
15 
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¥~ 
a 
THE COURT. Well, it has been read. 
MR. HANSEN. I will withdraw the objection. 
THE COURT. You may proceed 
"Q. It had ended the case? A. No. Q. What more 
did you think was involved? A. I wanted to have a 
word with my attorney. Q. Was there anything else 
to be settled? A, No." " " 
: (by Mr. Tibbs) Were those questions made and did 
you answer as I have read? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Now, the fifth line from the bottom, on page 14 of 
your deposition. 
"Q. Just the Attorney fee was all, is that right, yes 
or no? MR. HANSEN. Object as callng for a con-
clusion of the witness He can testify as to what was 
said but not his conclusions to the legal effect of it." 
MR. TIBBS. Now on page 15. 
"Q. Please answer it? A. It was not the Attorney 
fee. I had to see the Attorney, he had the case. He 
had my case. I can't come to you and settle with you 
or anyone, isn't that law? I am not much up on law 
questions. Q. That is as you understood, that it was 
finished? A. Yes7~sff7r"" " ^ 
MR. TIBBS. "and after~~~you got with the Attorney 
Q. (by Mr. Tibbs) Did you answer those answers to my 
questions, as I have read? 
A. Yes, sir." 
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Again (Tr. 141), on redirect . . . (line 28) the question 
was put by his own attorney: 
Q: You intended him to keep the $8,000.00? 
A: I could not do anything about it." 
We submit there can be no error in any of the find-: 
ings or in the judgment i nthis case, in the light of the 
foregoing testimony of the plaintiff Kenneth Rasmussen 
and of the pleadings in this case. 
APPELLANTS POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE 
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT 
IS FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT 
PLAINTIFFS TERMINATED S A I D CONTRACT OF 
THEIR OWN FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00 
DOWN PAYMENT PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT 
SHOULD BE AND HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAIN 
TIFFS TO DEFENDANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, 
WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMI-
NATES ANY QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO BE DETER-
MINED BY THE JURY. (R. 73) 
We agree with Counsel for Appellants wherein they 
state that even if the provisions of the contract dealing with 
the matter of that forfeiure were held to be valid contrary 
to appellants' contention, that would not solve the contro-
versy between the parties to this action. 
We also assert that a finding or holding by the court in 
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favor of defendants position with respect to the so-called forfeit-
ure provisions of the contract would not have solved the con-
troversy between these parties as the case stood on the sup-
plemental pleadings. 
Both propositons are true because those issues were no 
longer in the case. 
In light of this, Perkins et al V. Spencer, et al, 243 
Pac 446, does not apply to this case. 
We feel constrained, however, to make the following 
observations concerning the law of Perkins et al V. Spencer 
et al. That case does not hold nor do any of the authorities, 
so far as we know, that forfeiture clauses, or liquidated 
damage clauses, are void as a matter of law. The law is 
that such provisions will not be enforced by a court of 
equity, if to enforce them will result in inequity and in-
justice to the delinquent party to a sales contract of the 
kind we have here. In this case the court held that the for-
feiture clause, under the facts and circumstances shown by 
plaintiffs was not an injustce to the plaintiffs. 
So we submit there is not error in appellants point 
Four. 
APPELLANTS POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS FAILED TO PAY THEIR PART OF THE TAXES 
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT 
AND FAILED TO PAY THE FIRE INSURANCE PRE-
MIUM UPON THE PROPERTY. 
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It is true the evidence does not show how much in 
taxes plaintiffs had failed to pay. 
But Mr. Rasmussen (Tr. 225) testified that in December 
they had not paid their share of the taxes. 
APPELLANTS POINTS SIX, SEVEN and EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES 
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR 
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND THE DEFENDANTS 
SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DE-
FENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST 
THE PLAINTIFFS. 
What has already been written reputes, in our esti-
mation, the propositions contained in appellants' Points six, 
seven and eight. 
The evidence shows that the parties got together and 
compromised their lawsuit; the plaintiffs failed to prove the 
issues whch they had to prove, as the pleadings stood at the 
time of the trial; they failed to make a case, so there was 
nothing for the court to do but to dismiss the action and 
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award defendants judgment for their costs. 
We therefore respectfully submit that the judgment 
should be affirmed and respondents awarded their costs. 
Respectfully 
DON V. TIBBS 
DILWORTH WOOLLEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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